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town will take my remarks seriously, be-
cause the fault is not entirely on one side. 
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I 
want to add my commendation to those 
of my colleagues to the distinguished 
senior Senator from Vermont for the re-
marks he made this morning. As always , 
listening to Senator AIKEN is education-
al. When he speaks, it is like a breath of 
fresh air. His candor is commendable. 
His integrity, his ability, and his honesty 
are unquestioned. Would that we had 
more GEORGE AIKENS. The country would 
be a good deal better off. 
I agree with the distinguished Senator 
in his call for bipartisanship. I have been 
aware of the fact that in all too many 
discussions in this body there have been 
those who have a t tacked, those who have 
defended, and very few who have under-
stood the gray area in between. The fault 
lies not wholly with the White House, 
nor does virtue lie wholly within the con-
fines of the Senate. We have both made 
our share of mistakes. 
I would hope, in the interest of the 
Nation, the responsibility which the Sen-
ate has shown during the past 2 years 
will continue, and that all of us will work 
together-the legislative and the execu-
tive-to end that the Nation will come 
ahead of any particular party. 
ORDER OF BUSINESS 
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tem-
pore. Under the previous order, the Sen-
ator from Montana is recognized for 15 
minutes. 
FOREIGN AID POLICY 
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, this 
has been a troubled and confusing and 
agonizing weekend. We have been con-
fronted with a request for tens of mil-
lions of dollars in aid for Cambodia, in 
addition to aid for Indonesia, Vietnam, 
Korea, Lebanon, Jordan, and Israel. 
In all those areas, only one part was 
previouslY authorized, and that is the 
$500 million credit to Israel, which was 
incorporated in the defense authoriza-
tion bill, agreed to some weeks ago. The 
others are not authorized and will be the 
subject of hearings in committee and de-
bate on the ftoor of the Senate. 
I can find justification for assistance 
to Jordan and Lebanon in the sum of 
$30 million and $5 million, respectively, 
because it will tend to stabilize the situ-
ation in the Middle East; and the credits 
to Israel w!ll tend to keep us from be-
coming involved physically. I do not 
want to see this Nation become involved 
physically anywhere else in t he world 
unless it is in the interest of our own 
security; and when I say I do not want 
to see any more Vietnams, I mean it, be-
cause even one Vietnam is too much. 
I can understand also the reason for 
the aid-proposal for Korea, because it is 
tied to a drawdown of 20,000 American 
troops from that country. 
I can understand it in South Vietnam, 
because it is tied to the continued with-
drawal of U .B. troops. Hopefully that will 
be accelerated. 
But I find it difficult to locate any 
compensating factors as far as the Cam-
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bodian-aid proposal is concerned. It ap-
pears to me that if we act on the basis 
of this request, we will just be making a 
second downpayment, because the first 
has already been made over the past few 
months by aid transfers to Cambodia 
through withdrawals from funds which 
had originally been allocated to Taiwan, 
Greece, and TUrkey. 
As to the situations which developed 
over the weekend. I am concerned. I am 
uneasy. When you tie the request for aid 
to Cambodia with the 250-plane flight 
over North Vietnam, with the commando 
raid some 23 miles west of Hanoi, I think 
we have a set of circumstances which 
should cause us concern. 
I grieve for all Americans, dead and 
wounded, whether they are in POW 
camps, whether they have been killed or 
wounded in action, or whether they have 
been casualties in Indochina other than 
in action. According to the latest figures 
which I have-and this is out of date 
now, because it goes only to November 7 
of this year-291,559 Americans have 
been wounded, 43,959 have died in com-
bat, and 8,798 have died from other 
causes. The total dead about 3 weeks ago 
stood at 52,757 and the total casualties, 
dead and wounded, at 34i,316. 
I grieve for those men, as I have said, 
because they are car rying out their ob-
ligation in a war which is highly un-
popular and, in my opinion, totally un-
necessary-a war which is one of the 
great tragedies in the annals of this Re-
public, a war which is causing a contin-
uing drain on the morale of the Ameri-
can people, a war which makes the trou-
bles confronting us at home much more 
ditncult to confront. 
I was heartened by the President's ne-
gotiating proposals of October 7, because 
I thought they contained a good deal of 
substance, and tied in with the proposals 
from Hanoi of September 17. It was my 
belief that the groundwork for possible 
negotiations had been laid. I still think 
that is the case. But now I wonder about 
the possibility of reinvolvement, based on 
the raids north. I wonder about the re-
action of Hanoi to the commando raid 
and these retaliatory air raids for the 
shooting down of a U.S. reconnaissance 
plane. I wonder about the situation 
which.confronts the prisoners of war, and 
whether the commando raid will be help-
ful or harmful; and I would wonder no 
less even if the ra id had been successful, 
because it has placed those prisoners in 
a very ditncult position, and we do have 
to think of them at all times. 
Then I wonder about the effect these 
events may have on the Paris talks-! 
emphasize the word "talks," because ne-
gotiations have not as yet gotten under-
way. 
All these things are matters which the 
Senate should consider, which the ad-
ministration should consider, and hope-
fUlly, in the words of the distinguished 
Senator from Vermont and on the basis 
of his sage advice, that we would consiQ,er 
together, so that we could work in com-
mon for the common good. 
There has been some talk about an 
understanding between North Vietnam 
and Uiis Government relative to the use 
of reconnaissance planes over the past 
2 years. Frankly, I know of no such un-
derstanding. There may be one, but it so, 
I am totally unaware of it. I am assuming 
that an understanding is being asswned 
on our part; that on the basis of the stoP-
page of the bombing of the North, it was 
tacitly understood- we asswned-that 
we would be given the right to continue 
reconnaissance fiights. 
I would point out that history seems to 
prove that air power is not the weapon 
which so many advocates seem to think it 
is . To see what it does one needs only look 
to England as an example, or to North 
Vietnam in the past. The end result is 
d~mage temporarily, but a stiffening of 
the spine of the people bombed for a long 
period of time. 
The President does have a responsi-
bility. His is the Ultimate responsibility. 
But, as the distinguished Senator from 
Vermont has indicated. we also have a 
responsibility. 
It woUld do us no good to give up and 
lie down. because then we would be shirk-
ing our duty. We can and we should, in 
good conscience, support the President 
when we think he is right, and suoport 
him fUlly But, also in good conscience, 
when we think the President has made a 
wrong move, we have the right and the 
responsibility to disagree, and to do so on 
a constructive basis, so that the relation-
ship between the two segments of our 
Government will not be ruptured as a re-
sUlt. 
May I say that I admire the courage of 
the commandos who undertook this raid 
in an attempt to free some American 
POW's. It was a bold stroke. Those men 
who participated in it are entitled to the 
highest commendation. But I also raise 
the question as to the reliability of our in-
telligence. 
I recall, for example, that when we 
moved into Cambodia, it was to capture 
the so-called headquarters of the North 
Vietnamese and the Vietcong-a head-
quarters which, incidentally, was never 
discovered. Evidently, as the basis for this 
recent commando raid, we were again de-
pending on what we thought was reliable 
intelligence, but according to the reports 
which appeared in the press, that camp 
had been evacuated at least 2 weeks be-
fore. It was a successful penetration, but 
the objective was not achieved. My con-
cern now is for the prisoners of war who 
are still being held in North Vietnam, 
and what the reaction by North Vietnam 
to this raid by air and by land will be on 
them. Their future is something all of us 
must keep in mind; their safety is some-
thing which all of us devoutly pray for. 
I wonder if the Senator from Vermont 
noticed, in the Washington Post yester-
day, a swnmary of a recent special edi-
tion of the Foreign Service Journal. Be-
fore I carry this further, Mr. President, I 
ask unanimous consent that that swn-
mary, in an article entitled "Nixon Doc-
trine Battles Those Who Must Use It," 
written by Murrey Marder, and published 
in the Washington Post of Monday, 
November 23, 1970, and another article 
entitled "Viet War: A New Version," 
written by Stanley Kamow, and also 
published in yesterday's Washington 
Post, be printed in the RECORD at the con-
clusion of my remarks. 
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tem-
pore. Without objection, it is so ordered. 
<See exhibits 1 and 2.) 
Mr. MANSFIELD. Both articles are 
relevant to what the Senator from Ver-
mont has so ably stated. One is a frank 
exposition of the reaction of profession-
al U.S. diplomats to the Nixon doctrine 
in Asia. The other· by Mr. Karnow 
touches on the basic factor that seems to 
trap successive administrations-includ-
ing the present administration-in this 
unending involvement in Indochina not-
withstanding efforts to terminate it. 
The swnmary of the special issue of the 
Foreign Service Journal points out that 
many of our diplomats who are closely 
involved in Asian affairs were fearfUl of 
the sweeping change In policy implicit in 
the Nixon doctrine when It was first pro-
posed. In due course, however, they came 
to see that the implied change really was 
not going to be much of a change at all 
and that the Idea of "lowering our pro-
file" a little might actually have some 
virtue. 
One may wonder at their reactions, 
now, after even this modest scaledown 
seems to be in the process of abandon-
ment, with the renewed expansion of the 
battle area by the bombing of North 
Vietnam and by this recent abortive at-
tempt to free prisoners of war near 
Hanoi. One may wonder, too, at the Im-
plications of the Cambodian aid request 
for the Nixon doctrine which, I should 
note, I have supported since its inception 
as an expression of a long-needed change 
in policy to the end that It might lead 
us out of this tragic and misbegotten 
military involvement on the Asian main-
land. 
In any event, I am led by those 
articles to address certain questions. 
I am sure the Senator from Vermont 
would concur that it the Nixon doctrine 
has .a fundamental purpose, It is to ''lower 
the U.S. profile'' so as to reduce and 
terminate in a progressive fashion the 
excessive involvement of the United 
States on the Asian mainland, a situa-
tion brought about largely by the pres-
ence of our military forces and by mili-
tary or other massive aid. 
Mr. AIKEN. What I tried to point out 
was that we should have a uniform in-
terpretation of the Nixon doctrine for 
all countries, and not one interpretation 
for one country and one for another. If 
the Nixon doctrine is good for Southeast 
Asia, it is, of course, good for most of 
the rest of the world. We do not want 
one interpretation of it for Vietnam, an-
other for Nigeria, a third for Chile, or 
perhaps a fourth for some other part of 
the world. 
· I have told the State Department, for 
whatever good it may do, that our am-
bassadors in foreign countries should all 
be given uniform interpretations of the 
Nixon doctrine and just what it means. 
As I pointed out, the Cooper-Church 
amendment in no way confiicted with the 
Nixon doctrine. In fact, it supported it. 
Yet, it was interpl'eted as being a hostile 
act on the part of Congress. 
Mr. MANSFIELD. I would agree with 
the Senator completely. I concur in what 
he has to sa,y about the Cooper-Church 
amendment, it was in accord with what 
Mike Mansfield Papers, Series 21, Box 46 , Folder 81, Mansfield Library, University of Montana.
s 18786 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD- SENATE November 24, 1970 
I understood to be the Nixon doctrine as 
it has been enunciated and propounded 
by the White House and the State De-
partment. 
I should like to ask the Senator 
another question. 
Does the Senator think that the Nixon 
doctrine is served by the recent bombing 
of North Vietnam? To put it another 
way, does that action raise or "lower the 
profile of the United States in Asia"? Is 
it likely to shorten or prolong the time 
it wlll take to get our military forces out 
of all Indochina? 
Mr. AIKEN. I think the answer to 
those questions is perfecUy obvious. It 
does not improve our profile in the rest 
of the world. It will not improve our 
prospects of getting completely out of 
the war in Southeast Asia at &al early 
~te. ' 
In fact, we have been through this be-
fore. The majority leader may remember 
the day we were called to the White 
House, along with several of our col-
leagues, to be advised that we would un-
dertake the bombing of North Vietnam; 
and it was pointed out that a few bombs 
dropped on them would ooon bring them 
to their knees and they would be begging 
for peace. 
Mr. MANSFIELD. The Senator is cor-
rect. 
Mr. AIKEN. The Senator may recall 
that I protested rather vigorously to the 
President, Mr. McNamara, and Secre-
tarY Rusk, but they went ahead with it. 
I believe we lost a thousand planes, in-
cluding many of our finest aviators, and 
something like 500 helicopters. I fear 
that these new raids, these incursions-
! hope they are incursions and not a 
prelude to any invasion-wlll simply de-
lay the end of the war, just as the initial 
bombing of North Vietnam. 
I do worcy about the effect which this 
failure to rescue prisoners o! war-in 
spite of the fact that it was bravely car-
ried out--may have on the more than 
450 Americans now. being held. I believe 
that we cannot abandon those people. 
The South Vietnamese hold about 30,000 
prisoners of war. North Vietnam holds 
over 450 hostages, according to our best 
estimates. Certainly, we are not going to 
abandon the hostages who are held by 
the North Vietnamese, and the war wll1 
not be over until they have been ac-
counted for and released. 
I certainly appreciate the remarks of 
the Senator from Montana in regard to 
this whole matter. It points up the need 
for better understanding. 
I understand, Mr. President, that per-
haps two or three Members of Congress 
were called in the middle o! the night to 
be advised that the resumption of the 
air raids on Vietnam was in effect. But 
that is not consultation. 
Mr. MANSFIELD. No. But I would say 
it is a continuation of an old policy in 
which certain members have been in-
formed after the fact. That happened in 
previous administrations as well. 
Mr. AIKEN. The Senator may recall 
that the previous President, the prede-
cessor to President Nixon, used to advise 
us shortly before the !act, a few hours in 
advance, and then asked us to keep still 
about it, which we did. 
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ap-
preciate the remarks of the distinguished 
Senator from Vermont. 
I ask unanimous consent that excerpts 
from my interpretation of the Nixon 
doctrine, as contained in a report I made 
to the Committee on Foreign Relations 
and to the President in a private capac-
ity, a year ago last August, be printed at 
this point in the RECORD. 
There being no objection, the excerpts 
were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, 
as follows : 
PERSPECI'IVE ON AsiA: THE NEW U.S. 
DOCTRINE AND SOUTHEAST AsiA 
(Report of Senator MIKE MANsFIELD to the 
Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. 
Senate) 
Today, there are treaties and executive 
agreements and an accumulation of deci-
sions of the executive branch which enmesh 
this Nation deeply In the affairs of Southeast 
Asia. In consequence, there are over 600,000 
U.S. troops In South VIetnam and 60,000 In 
Thailand. In the general area and at least 
partially connected with our Involvement In 
Southeast Asia are 40,000 men In Japan; 
45,000 In Okinawa; 10,000 In Taiwan; 60,000 
In the 7th Fleet; ' 30,000 In the Philippines 
and additional thousands on Guam-In all, a 
figure approaching 800,000. 
Whatever the Initial validity at these Im-
mense conunttments, there Is growing doubt 
as to whether It Is wise or beneficial :for this 
Nation e.nd the countries concerned to per-
petuate the present state of a.ffa:lr!;. In the 
first place, the Independence at Asle.n coun-
tries would be hollow Indeed I! ~t ~nvolved 
merely an exclhange o! a pest colonial status 
for the Indefinite prop of U.S. support. From 
our own point of view, moreover, the United 
States Is feeling the adverse effects o! the 
prolonged expenditure at lives and enorm.ous 
resources and energy abroad, most at it In 
VIetnam and Southeast A.sta. 
In the •llllter1m, needs 1llt home have been 
neglected- needs which are too obviOUB and 
omnipresent to require cataloging. They a.re 
all around us whetiher we live 1n cities ocr 
on fe.rm.s, whether our homee e.re In New 
York, Washington, California, the Midwest, 
ocr Monte.na. The solution at these IPrc:Jb-
lems-whether they Involve equality of treat-
ment or pollution of air and water, or edu-
cation, or public sa.!ety, or tre.nsportatlon 
and roads, or whatever-will require great 
and sustained Inputs at lnt.1llwtlve e.nd Rtten-
tlon at a tlma when these assete &ire hesvllly 
diverted abroad. They wiLl also require sub-
stantial public funds In R period of lntla.tlon 
and of heavy tax burdens which l'e&ult in 
large measure from military eX>pendltures 
overseas and, notably, from the war In VIet-
nam. 
While urgent. needs at home are neglected, 
tlhere Is deep ooncern over the we.r In Vlet-
ns.m which Is still without an end In sight. 
The conf!1ct con1llnues to result In addl· 
tlonal American dead e.nd wounded every 
week and In expendl.tures at . the rate at 
about •3 million an hour. Moreover, else-
where In Southeast Asia there are shadow 
wars and the pockma.rlal of violent Internal 
dissension. That these situations, under our 
present course, m.lg'ht evolve in the pe.ttern 
of Vletnam gives rise 'to furtlher concern. 
Doubts as. to our Asian 8ipproo.ch are also 
fed by the vi.!Jible consequences of the mase 
entry of American soldiers, money, and ol!l-
clal establishments Into Boutheeat Asia. To 
be sure, this entry has brought a gTeat lnf!ow 
of wealth and modern technology. In some 
places, however, !little that Is construct! ve Is 
v1sJble as a result. The very magnitude at 
the American Involvement, em.erglng' as It 
has In a EhOl't spa.n at tlme, has Imposed e.n 
almoot Indigestible allen presence e.nd pr&-
clpltated severe cultural conVUilslons. 
To date, we have acted on the scale that 
we have In Southeast Asia largely to support 
small nations against what has been calcu-
lated as the threat of Communist aggres-
sion-notably from China. In fact, there was 
little expression of fear In any of the 
countries visited of an attack or Invasion 
!rom China. Considerable concern does exist 
however, that Internal Insurgent movemenu; 
whose origins lie In local grievances or con-
f!lcts will be used as spearheads to Influence 
by China or by North VIetnam. The principal 
threat to most existing governments In 
Southeast Asia, In short, seems t o arise from 
within Southeast Asia at this time . 
It seems to me that our presumption of a 
primary danger to tbe Southeast Asian coun-
tries, which they themselves do not perceive, 
does not provide a sound basis for U.S. policy. 
Rather, It tends to create for this Nation the 
role of self-appointed, great power protector 
In an area In which a militant young na-
tionalism speaks the common language ot 
resistance to foreign Intrusion. It ls sober-
Ing to recall, In this connection, that this Na-
tion has never been an Asian power and, In 
my judgment, It Is essential to avoid a fur-
ther glissade Into that Ill-fitting role. Our 
vital Interests wit h respect to the Asian main-
land have always been peripheral. They are 
peripheral now. They are likely to remain 
peripheral In the future. 
On the other hand, we have been and will 
continue to be a Pacific power. VItal na-
tional Interests are Indeed, lodged In that 
ocean. Four of our States border on the Pa-
cific. In addition, one of t hem, Hawaii, lies 
In the middle of that vast expanse of water. 
We have territories and dependencies all over 
the Pacific. The Aleutian Islanrls are n•rt of 
the State of Aalska. American Samoa, Guam, 
Wake, Johnston, Midway and the Howland, 
Baker, and Jarvis Islands are dependencies 
of the United States. The Trust Territory ot 
the Pacific Islands, which we have adminis -
tered since the end of World War II, com-
prises over 2,000 Islands and atolls with a la!ld 
area of 678 square miles scattered over 3 mil-
lion square miles of the Pacl.tl.c. 
As a Pacific power, we have and will con-
tinue to have a profound Interest In what 
transpires In the western reaches of the 
ocean. In my judgement, however, that In-
terest can best be expressed not by our Im-
mersion In the regions ' Internal political at-
fairs but by an orderly shift to a restrained 
and judicious participation, as on Pacific na-
tion among several, In Its peacef~ develop-
ment. 
Indeed, It Is difficult to discern any other 
reasonable course for this Nation In present 
circumstances. It Is a new day In Asia. The 
age In which foreign military dominance of 
any Asian people was a practical possibility 
has long since ended. Even the postwar pe-
riod of one-sided dependency- most of It on 
the United States-Is drawing to a close. 
Civilized survival, not to speak of peace and 
progress In the Western Pacific , may well de-
pend on the timely emergence of a new age 
of cooperation based on equality and on a 
mutuality of responsibility, respect, and tol-
erance between this Nation and all the s tates 
of Asia. 
II. THE PRESmENT'S NEW ASIAN DOCTRINE 
In the course of his recent trip, President 
Nixon enunciated In the Guam Declaration a 
new approach to Asia and the Western Pa-
cific which seems to me to take cognizance 
of the considerations that are outlined In the 
Introductory section of this report. The Pres-
Ident's Asian doctrine contains the following 
precepts, as I Introduced them and as I Inter-
preted them to various :Asian leaders: 
1. The United States will maintain Its 
treaty commitments, 'but It Is anticipated 
that Asian nations will be a-ble to handle 
their own defense problems, perhaps with 
some outside material assistance but with-
out outside manpower. Nuclear threats are 
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another matter, and such threats wllJ con-
tinue to be checked by counterpoised nuclear 
capacity. 
2. As a Paclt!c pOwer, the United States will 
not turn Its •back on nations of the Western 
Pacific and Asia; the countries of that re-
gion will not be denied a concerned and un-
derstand.lng ear In this Nation. 
3. The United States will avoid the cr.eatlon 
of situations In which there .Is such great 
dependence on us that, lnevlt&bly, we become 
enmeshed In what are essentially Asian prob-
lema and confilcts. 
4. To the extent that material assistance 
may be forthcoming from·the United States, 
more emphasis will be placed on economic 
help and less on military assistance. 
5. The future role of the United States will 
continue to be significant In the affairs of 
Asia. It will be enacted, however, largely 
In the economic realm and on the basis of 
multilateral cooperation. 
6. The United States will look with favor 
on multilateral political, economic, and se-
curity arrangements among the Asian nations 
and, where appropriate, will assist In effort& 
which may be undertaken thereunder. 
In. JU:ACfiONS TO THE NEW ASIAN DOCI'RINE 
Achievement of many of the objectives 
stated above Involves a reduction In the U.S. 
presence In Southeast Asia. WhUe this re-
port does not deal with VIetnam, It Is ob-
vious that the war there Is the main cause 
of the massive dimensions which the U.S. 
presence bas attained. That the po88lbllltles 
of diminution are bound up with the end 
of that tragic confUct does not mean that 
application of the new doctrine must await 
the war's termination. Quite apart from VIet-
nam, there are other areas where contrac-
tions may be possible. Most Immediately, 
under the new approach there Is the po881-
blllty of curbing what seem to be built-In 
tendencies In the many-sided U.S. establish-
ments In Asia to e:rpand the U .S . presence. 
In general, the leaders of Asian countries 
agree that the role of the United States 
In Asian atralrs should shrink. Some uneasi-
ness does exist that the pendulum will awing 
too far, from overlnvolvement to noninvolve-
ment. The fear Is that the United States may 
leave the smaller Asian statee In Isolation and 
under the shadow of one or anOther more 
powerful neighbor. 
There Is also some uncertainty as to what 
the new doctrine will mean In apectflc terms. 
This uncertainty Is understandable since 
there was not, at the time of my visit, any 
sign of a followthrough to the new doctrine. 
Indeed, other than the transient stimulus 
of the President's recent personal appear-
ance, little, If any, change was visible. The 
concepts, practices, and programs by which 
U.S. missions In Asia have operated tor many 
year remain the same. 
Notwithstanding the President's recent 
visit and Presidential stAtements to the con-
trary, some U.S . missions still expect this 
Nation to continue as a major military fattor 
In Southeast Asia after the conclusion of the 
war In VIetnam. Developments within South-
east Asian countries are still referred to as 
"vltal"to this Nation's Interests, "vital" 1m-
plying more of a commitment than can be 
derived from a reasonable reading ot the 
President's new approach. Ironically, In some 
U.S. embassies an Inconsistency Is not seen 
between budgetary requests for greatly In-
creased U.S. bllaterlll &881stance and, hence, 
greater U.S. participation In the Indigenous 
situation, on the one hand, and the admln-
latratlon's new doctrine on the other. 
In short, there Is no Indication, as yet, of 
when or how the size of the U.S. presence In 
Asia Ia to be reduced In any significant de-
gree. It Ia a fact that the only redUctions con-
templated at the time of my visit were those 
which might result from a continuance of 
periodic blanket percentage cuts In person-
nel. These cuts were begun m?re than a yee.r 
ago, not as a matter of policy so much as a 
measure of economy and as a palliative for 
balance-of-payments concerns. 
It would appear, therefore, that the first 
order of business under the new doctrine Is to 
see to It that the President's new concepts are 
reiterated and thoroughly explained through-
out the U.S. departments and agencies con-
cerned and that they are disseminated among 
all U.S. officials In Southeast Asia. It would 
appear, too, that directives which are both 
clear and firm will have to emanate from 
Washington If these concepts are to be ap-
plied etrectlvely and with necessary dlspatcll 
by U.S. missions In Southeast Asia. 
V . CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
The President's new doctrine clearly calls 
for a con traction of the ot!lclal U.S. presence 
In Southeast Asia. In some Instances, the na-
tions of the region have anticipated this 
contraction; In all the nations which I vis-
Ited, there Is understanding of Ita Inevitabil-
Ity. Most are ready for the transition and, 
In general, welcome It, provided the U.S. 
Interest does not dlsapJ>ear suddenly under 
a tidal wave o! national retrenchment or 
lndltrerence . 
The President's doctrine, o! course, does 
not carry In any sense the latter Implication. 
Indeed, only by an utter disregard of our own 
national Interests could we disengage com-
pletely our concern from the atralrs of the 
Western Paclftc. Without any such abrupt 
witl;ldrawal , the re 1s ample room for a.n or-
derly contraction of the prevailing U.S . pres-
ence In Asia. Most pressing, there Is an Im-
mediate need for restraints on the built-In 
tendency of the presence to grow 
There Is room, for example, for the !ol-
lowlng: 
1. A c ontradiction of bilateral U.S. aid ef-
forts and a shift to expanding U.S. partici-
pation In multilateral etrorts In the economic 
development of the region. 
2. A rigid and Immediate curb on military 
aid and no deepening of our direct military 
Involvement with any Asian government, to 
be followed by a reexamination of longstand-
Ing treaty commitments and their organiza-
tional substructures, n otably SEATO 
3. Official encouragement and support of 
commercial , cultural , techntcal, and all other 
forms o! nonmilitary Interchange on a mu-
tual basis, scaled to the level of the capacity 
and the clearly e:rpressed desires of the Asian 
nations. 
In my judgment, an Interpretation of the 
administration's doctrine Into policies and 
practices which follow the above lines would 
be acceptable In most Southeast Asian na-
tions. Nor Is It a matter of waiting for the 
end of the war In VIetnam. To be sure, when 
this costly and tragic enmeshment Is brought 
to a close, the way will be !acllltated for 
more rapid Qhange. As I have already Indi-
cated above, however, and, as I have detailed 
In specific recommendations to the President 
In confidential reports, there Is much that 
can be Initiated now In order to contract 
and adjust American activities In Southeast 
Asia to bring them Into line with his Guam 
Declaration. 
It Is necessary to reiterate, however, that 
as of the time of my visit to the region, the 
President's prono'Uncementa had brought no 
follow-through In the U.S. mi88lons abroad. 
Nor did they Indicate to me the receipt of 
new guidance and Instructions from the 
agencies of the executive branch. It would 
seem to me, therefore, that If the President's 
Initiative Is to precipitate the changes which 
It promises. there Is 11 need for close collabor-
ation between the responsible ot!lc1als In the 
elected administration a.nd the Congress. 
As a first step, It would be my suggestion 
that an Immediate freeze be placed on all 
official personnel Increases, millte.ry or civil-
Ian, In Southeast Asia whether by Presl-
dl\ntlal order, with strong Congressional sup-
port, or, lf necesse.ry, by legtlllatlon, sup-. 
ported by the President, pending fUll st u dy 
ot the wide range of funct ions which are 
now pursued by U.S. Government agencies In 
Southeast Asia. Some of these functions 
which began many years ago appear m-
fltted or Ill-scaled to present need. A full 
examination of this kind might well Involve 
a Joint etrort of the President and the Con-
gress, or It might Involve parallel studies 
or multiple studies by one or the other. How-
ever It proceeds, this study should go for-
ward, In my judgment, without delay. It Is 
essential to the maintenance of a U.S. posi-
tion In Southeast Asia which Is relevant to 
our national Interests, t o the Interests of the 
people of Asia and to the peace of the Pactflc. 
Mr. MANSFIELD. May I say that the 
Nixon doctrine, to me, means a low 
profile, not just in Southeast Asia or in 
east Asia, but also In all other parts of 
the world, as the Senator from Ver-
mont has said. The Nixon doctrine means 
to me that troops will gradually be with-
drawn from overseas in places such as 
Korea, Vietnam, Thailand, Taiwan, 
Okinawa, Japan, and the Philippine 
Islands, and that onr bases will be re-
duced-they rtumber approximately 2,000 
at the present time-and that this doc-
trine applies to Western Europe just as 
it does to Asia. 
May I say, also, that I concur with 
the distinguished Senator from Vermont, 
the ranking Republican In this body, in 
his plea for a bipartisan conduct of our 
foreign policy and closer consultation be-
tween the Executive and the Senate. 
Somewhere, somehow, there must be the 
beginnings of an end to the conflict in 
which we are engaged, and that end 
will have to be, In my opinion, not a . 
miltary settlement, not a tit-for-tat. pol-
icy, but a negotiated settlement. Until 
that negotiated settlement is found, the 
fires of conflict will continue to blaze In 
Indochina; and if the fires continue to 
burn, what nation will then claim the 
victory? All nations Involved will only 
have lost. 
So I join the Senator. I hope that 
what he has had to ~;ay will be given con-
sideration downtown, I hope that all of 
us, regardless of our feelings , will recog-
nize that there is no black and white 
picture so far as Southeast Asia is con-
cerned; that there are gray areas which 
must be considered. Hopefully, there will 
come a coordination and an accommoda-
tion and a sense · of cooperation which 
will benefit us not as individuals, not the 
parties we represent, but--to repeat what 
I said in the beginnin~ and which I think 
is the basis of the distinguished Senator's 
speech-the welfare of the people of the 
Nation. 
Mr. AIKEN. Mr. President, I point out 
again that, to me, the Nixon doctrine 
means that we play as a member of the 
team and not as a coach who assigns each 
of the other members to the position 
which we think. they should occupy. 
Mr. MANSFIELD. Yes. Not leadership; 
partnership would be better. 
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